Erenlai - Items filtered by date: Thursday, 30 September 2010

かわいい」(卡哇伊)之風席捲全球,但在這個詞彙的發源地──日本,如今卻在二十歲到四十歲各世代女性之間,掀起了一場搶奪「かわいい」擁有權的爭戰!


Friday, 01 October 2010 03:42

數位胖卡,串行臺灣

一部沒有空調、高齡十年的中古麵包車,加上資訊裝備以及俗稱「宅男」的重度網路使用者,共同構成了「胖卡」計畫,企圖搭起城鄉資源互通的橋樑。


還記得三聚氰胺毒奶粉事件嗎?或許我們從不曾想像這世上有人為了欺騙檢驗儀器,竟然會在生乳中添加化學品,以製造「高氮含量」的假象。更荒唐的是我們依賴的食品檢驗機制,竟然對此不斷改變標準,顯得無能為力,並造成之後一連串的社會不安。

 

Published in 書評
Friday, 01 October 2010 00:00

書評:無名為天地之始

教一個人說一種新的語言,就能將她變成另一種人,還有比這件事更重要的嗎?這樣做,階級之間、靈魂之間最深的鴻溝,都能彌平。

 

──希金斯教授,《窈窕淑女》(My Fair Lady),1964

 

 
Published in 書評
Friday, 01 October 2010 00:00

遊藝、換帖、交朋友

現代人已不太提筆寫信了。不過,在四百年前,在那個沒有臉書噗浪E-mail的年代,利瑪竇剛來到中國之時,寫信、贈墨是文人交際最「夯」的手段。

 

Friday, 01 October 2010 00:00

藝術,C'est la Vie!

「以前當學生的時候,有次和同學坐計程車,司機一聽到我們念舞蹈系,就說:『你們是跳R2(編註:指著名的綜藝舞蹈團體「馬雷蒙舞團」)的嗎?』聽起來很好笑對不對?當時許多人對舞蹈的認識大概都是這樣。直到雲門舞集出現,大家才比較清楚現代舞是怎麼一回事。」譚惠貞說。
 
Thursday, 30 September 2010 19:00

民間意見,草根實踐

「縮減數位落差」是臺北縣政府努力執行的政策方針,也已累積了相當多的成果,讓民眾在生活上更方便。不過,為了讓執政者更清楚理解政策執行的盲點,《人籟》邀請了三位和臺北縣密切相關的人士,分別對臺北縣「縮減數位落差」政策,提出自身的觀察及意見,並請王主委分別回應 。

三位分別是曾任警員,深耕基層多年的現任縣議員林國春、即將參選新北市議員的李坤城,及被稱為「淡水孩子王」的王鐘銘。此一紙上圓桌論壇的對話機會,是希望對目前的政策,提出更多元、更草根的民間觀點。

臺北縣政府自民國97年以來,開始推行縮減數位落差的工作。從政府內部組織的簡政便民,到設立數位希望據點和行動電腦教室,得到相關服務的民眾已超過卅萬人次。臺北縣是全臺灣第一大縣,幅員遼闊,人口結構多元,「縮減數位落差」所將面臨的困難若能有效解決,那麼將不只是解決了臺北縣自身的數位落差問題,也等於是解決了全臺灣一大部分的數位落差問題。為瞭解臺北縣目前的狀況,我們專訪了擔負此一任務的臺北縣政府研考會主委王振軒,分享推行政策的經驗。


In the secretive state of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), a look into the past reveals some explanations for the present state of things.

Snooping around for information on the DPRK isn't really rocket science, but you have to read between the lines. With the Dear Leader, Kim Jong-il, in bad shape, both international and domestic media have been quick to cover recent shifts in power and the promotions of his son, Kim Jong-un. Taking into consideration the amount of energy that was invested in building up Kim Jong-il’s reputation as a gifted, nurturing and obvious choice for his father’s successor, it’s unnerving to think that the state has neglected to strike up an equivalent propaganda campaign for his son in DPRK media, nor has his inherent genius been lauded to the point of conviction. Considering the high levels of ideological indoctrination in the DPRK, the state seems to be neglecting necessary prerequisites for a legitimate leadership.

The state ideology, Juche, is often simplistically translated by one-time analysts as ‘self-reliance’. Others have mislabeled it a state religion. Based on these perceptions, the fear of instability is warranted. But despite the lack of fanfare surrounding Kim Jong-un, the true mechanism of power is likely to remain unchanged.

The state claims that Juche is based upon concepts developed by Kim Il-sung during his time spent as a guerilla in Manchuria. However, Juche wasn’t standard vocabulary until the early-to-mid 1960s when Soviet relations with their North Korean brethren cooled and Kim Il-sung was obliged to seek friends in the Third World. These ideas were then later refined by Kim Jong-il who published his contribution, ‘On the Juche Idea’, in 1982. There is a significant amount of debate surrounding whether or not the works of the Kims are original; nevertheless, these ideas touch on a number of socio-political subjects, with arguments based in ad hoc interpretations of history. The dichotomy that analysts often neglect to observe is between what was originally written as a guide to Juche, and how media coverage of the leadership and publications of their ideas have since conveyed the purpose of the State. On the books, Juche is political and devoid of overtly religious statements, but its presentation and the tone of the media support claims that North Koreans are living in a politically religious state.

When Mussolini was intent on spreading the idea that the state should be number one in people’s hearts, his propaganda machine began producing stories that borrowed from preexisting Italian concepts of spirituality. Coverage of soldiers in the field employed similar vocabulary as that used to describe Christian martyrs and crusaders. The Soviets replaced icons in Orthodox ceremonies with pictures of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. In the DPRK, Juche and its institutions draw on a number of ideas based in religions that existed on the Korean Peninsula prior to its murky inception in the late 1940s.

Academic work by Kim Jong-il and press coverage in the media often utilize teleology; references to ‘the completion of the revolution and construction’ at some undisclosed point in the future is related to the Cheondogyoist (The Religion of the Heavenly Way) concepts of Gaebyeok, a term that, simply put, refers to the bonding of heaven and earth that will occur when all people understand Cheondogyo, an indigenous Korean New Religious Movement.

Kim Jong-il’s legitimacy as a ruler is reinforced by Confucian concepts of morality. The media builds up the Leader’s credentials, presenting the case that he (Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in their respective eras of rule) is unquestionably the leader of choice. There is apparently no one more suitable for the role than the leaders themselves; there is logically no need for pluralism. The state also legitimizes the Kims’ cults of personality by utilizing culturally familiar concepts of the family-state to show that the leader is a paternal leader who loves the people.

The choice of words that is associated with the leadership in numerous articles harbours rather obvious connections to Christianity. Articles in the Rodong Sinmun (the mouthpiece of the Korean Worker’s Party) often refer to the Generals as “saints”: “(Kim Jong-il) is indeed the great saint of revolution who gives ineffable affection to those once he met and blooms their life.”[1] Unblushingly, the father receives an even higher status, “Kim Il-sung is the most outstanding thinker and theoretician produced by the 20th century and the master of leadership who performed such exploits as winning one victory after another and a great revolutionary saint in the 20th century possessed of extraordinary personality and charisma that fascinated all the people.”[2] In the Korean version of the text, seongin, or saint, is not exactly the same prefix given to Christian saints in the Bible seongdo. However, other major religions of Korea do not use the word seongin when addressing enlightened individuals in their texts. Cheondogyo reserves the title of Daesinsa and Sinsa for its historically influential leaders. Buddhist acolytes are referred to as sami.

Terminology aside, the state is also intent on linking political thought with morality. The moral obligations of the people are strictly defined along political lines. The goods and evils of society are absolute. People are obliged to follow based on prefabricated concepts of morality rather than law. North Koreans are lead to believe that internal and external enemies threaten their revolutionary progress. Because of the perceived gravity of the situation, the question of morality and ethics in the DPRK is passionately polarized. The people are constantly reminded of the unquestionable goods associated with their leadership and traditional Korean culture. On the other hand, through state-run media, they are informed daily of the ever-present dangers associated with the sycophantic worship of foreign powers and the ever-present threat of imperialistic interventions. Examples of model citizenry are held in the highest esteem and historical references often reiterate the characteristics of model citizens.

 

Lyrics change, but the song remains the same.

classSince 1994, Juche has become less and less commonplace in the media, even though the state’s style and presentation has remained consistent. In need of military support following the death of his father and waves of natural disasters that wreaked havoc upon the population, Kim Jong-il was obliged to introduce Seongun Cheongchi, or military-first politics. It has come to dominate the slogan banners around Pyongyang although the occasional reference to Juche still manages to makes its way into the limelight.

Slogans and policies reflect the shift from the old guard of the Korean Workers Party to the military. In addition to this, the rift between the party and the military seems to be growing.

This shift away from the Party concerns China's top dogs. See the May 8th article covering Hu Jintao's speech at the DPRK/ PRC banquet during Kim's most recent visit (http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm). Hu repeatedly mentions the partnership of the Parties as the root for success and growth of the two countries. China's invitation to Kim in the midst of an investigation into an act of war was a clear signal that he was China's man and they would not support internal or external moves to change that.

In the tug of war for the balance of power, North Korea's military has, however, claimed its own victories. Pak Nam-gi, the financial director of the Workers' Party Korea Central Committee and a close adviser or Kim Jong-il was sacked in January and subsequently executed for his alleged responsibility in the currency reform bungle that wiped out family savings and brought public anger to a boiling point. In North Korean media he was often mentioned as an accompanying member of numerous facility tours by the Dear Leader. Yet there are other names that often come up, and they are nearly always mentioned first:

'Kim Jong-il inspects cattle farm of KPA unit' Nov 20, 2009

'...Central Committee of the He was accompanied by KPA [Korean People's Army] Generals Hyon Chol Hae, Ri Myong Su and other commanding officers of the army, Secretary of the WPK Kim Ki Nam and Department Directors of the WPK Central Committee Pak Nam Gi, Kim Kyong Hui and Jang Song Thaek.'

The Generals, Hyon Chol Hae, Ri Myong Su, are always present (at least in writing) on inspection tours of local KPA garrisons or facilities, they are often with him in non-KPA-related inspections, and they have been with him (minus Pak Nam Gi) in Kim's most recent tour. To name a few:

Kim Jong Il Inspects Hamhung Chemical Industry Univ. -- May 21, 2010
Kim Jong Il Inspects Taehongdan County -- May 19, 2010
Kim Jong Il Watches Football Match -- Nov 03, 2008
Kim Jong Il Appreciates Performance Given by State Symphony Orchestra -- Nov 27, 2006

Kim Jong-un might be the face for the new regime, but the real decisions will be made by the two men pinned to the gills with medals standing on either side of him. If they outlive the Dear Leader, from what little information we will be able to gather on them, Hyon Chol Hae and Ri Myong Su are two potential regents to watch.

The State will continue to utilize spiritual concepts to prop up the leadership. Although somewhat uncreative and excessively repetitive, propaganda in the DPRK works as a well-oiled machine. Its word choice and methodology stem back to pre-DPRK times and will employ the same strategy to prop up the leadership in the future. To the disappointment of both China and pundits predicting the imminent collapse of the DPRK following the death of Kim Jong-il, the state will putter along as it always has. Although the people will still be reading about the New Leader’s ability to instruct farmers how to grow more crops or, say, his gifted talent in foreign literature, Seongun Chongchi will continue to dominate the ideological arena and the military will continue to enjoy an internal position of strength in relation to the Party and the Kim Family.


[1] Seung Jae-sun and Pak Nam-jin, “Uri inmineun hyeongmyeongjeok insaenggwaneul chejilhwahan uidaehan inmin ida,” Rodong Sinmun, Dec 2, 1997.

[2] “Sun’s Day Observed,” Rodong Sinmun, April 15, 2001, KCNA online database: http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-k.htm.

每個時代,都有各自熟悉的溝通方式。舊時魚雁往返、飛鴿傳書,巴望著遠處捎來隻字片語;後來影音轉為類比訊號,彼岸烽火亦能輾轉呈現眼前;如今邁向數位,即便太空畫面歷歷在目,也僅需毫秒之差。

 

數位原生代

在數位科技環繞成長的世代,生活習慣自然與以往有別,科技已非需要刻意拜師學習的高深技藝,而是種如呼吸般理所當然的狀態。拜高科技與無線網路之賜,資訊傳遞以秒數算,各種消息唾手可得。隨拍即傳已成習慣,訊息來往經緯萬端,彼此聯繫溝通容易許多,更早已不受時空囿限。

對於這樣成長與生活的族群,有些人賦予一個新名詞:「數位原生代」。他們的生活裡,溝通與表現自我的門檻大幅降低,成名機會不再渺茫。只要勇於展現,連上網路,人人都可運用簡易工具與步驟,自建舞台、畫地為王。在數位時代,每個人都可以組織媒體,透過文字、圖像、影音,誰都可能一朝醒來,便揚名立萬、傳遍海內外。素人成為大明星的例子,在網路上族繁不及備載。

除了個人目的,數位原生代亦運用科技工作推動社會改革。過去紙筆連署與串連形式,如今搬遷至網路繼續進行,且由於數位科技的功能及特性,讓參與途徑更加容易與多元。小至轉載訊息、按鈕支持,大至拍攝影片、發起運動,科技工具創造無數介入機會,成員各司其職。不僅串連速度更快,轉化為實體行動時,也常能集結更多力量。

新世代形成知識的過程也和從前不同。百科全書過去總出自少數專家之手,而今在網路的「維基百科」上,你我皆可共同協作百科全書編纂。儘管並非毫無問題存在,但亦反映出知識不斷隨時代演進的現象,而不再只限一家之言。


打破一家之言

網路與數位科技去除一部分資訊傳遞的障礙,但單是如此,並不足以克服某些問題。

在理想社會中,人人生而平等,但實際上不然。生活在某些地區、使用某些語言的意見與事件,在國際媒體上,的確較容易獲得關注與報導。反觀其他地區的議題與形象,卻常是模糊一片或充滿刻板印象。

一群活躍於網路的部落客注意到這個失衡現象,於2004年底成立「全球之聲」(Global Voices Online)網站,串連世界各地的有志之士,聚焦於非西歐、非北美地區,希望透過網路的特性,突顯英語世界媒體長期忽略的消息與區域。藉由收集部落客對於國內外事件的反應,呈現不同於主流媒體與官方說法的意見及多元觀點,並將不同語言的訊息翻譯為英文,力圖促進對話、交流與溝通。


多元文化 全球行動

衝突往往是因為陌生與誤解而起,文化隔閡會導致對立與敵意。「全球之聲」希望呈現世界相異文化的相似處,也提供他山之石和前車之鑑,讓其他地區的人民面臨類似社會、經濟、環境等問題時,能參考他人的經驗與錯誤,也瞭解跨越種族與疆域界線的共通性。

近年來,世界各國天災人禍不斷。在諸如巴基斯坦水災、俄羅斯山林大火、馬達加斯加政變、伊朗大選爭議等事件後,民眾開始運用種種數位科技與網路工具,藉由手機簡訊及電子郵件通報消息,突破過往資訊傳遞的障礙,或是繞過政府言論封鎖及審查。另一方面,各地報章雜誌、廣播電視經費緊縮,駐外記者人數逐年下滑,各國民眾獲得國際資訊的管道也不斷受限。為此,全球之聲亦將報導翻譯為十數種語言,不僅包括通訊社較常見的中文、法文、西班牙文、俄文等,亦涵蓋塞爾維亞文、荷蘭文、馬其頓文等區域性語言,希望讓不諳英文者,同樣能以母語瞭解世界。

五年多來,「全球之聲」由一場40人的聚會,演變為超過 300人的國際志工組織。沒有實體辦公室,絕大多數成員皆為利用工作閒餘時間的志工。這群人共同展現數位原生代們的意志,嘗試在傳遞多元訊息和瞭解多元文化中,改變即有的社會,避免因誤解而造成的衝突。也就是說,「全球之聲」不只是一個網站,而是數位原生代重建理想社會的第一步。


參考資料:

全球之聲英文版網站中文版網站

攝影/Sarah

本文亦見於2010年10月號《人籟論辨月刊》


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